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SMITH, LYONS ESSAY 
Problems with the International Definition 
of a Refugee and a Possible Solution 
Toby D.J. Mendel* 
The discourse of altruism that characterizes most dis-
cussions ofrefugee law as currently established is there-
fore simply misplaced. To reflect a commitment to 
attaining a humane and dignified response to the needs 
of involuntary migrants, the time is clearly right to 
engage in a fundamental reassessment of strategy. 
Par consequent, le discours altruistique qui characterize 
la plupart des discussions du droit des refugies tel que 
nous le conaissons aujourd'hui est tout simplement 
deplace. Si nous voulons proner un engagement.envers 
l'etablissement d'une reponse, taut humanitaire 
qu'empreinte de dignite aux besoins de ces emigres 
involontaires, le temps est a une reevaluation en 
profondeur de notre strategie. 
Wla wesku'taqn wjit ktlamite'taqn tan telamkwa'toqleikl 
mawaknutmakn', wjit wesimkultitewk tepultaqnmwow, 
tan nike kisutasik, Lpajel opli ika'tasik. We'kayiw kisi 
tli ankamkuk nkutey elapukwemkel elnuey aqq kepmek 
teli maliaptasik tan teli nutatij wesimkultitewk, nike 
mawi nutak amskwesewey nekaqn wjit tan 
tla'taqititen. ** 
J.C. Hathaway 
"A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise 
of Refugee Law" 
(1990) 31 Harvard Int'l L. J. 129 at 181. 
INTRODUCTION 
The plight of refugees is one of the most urgent and complex 
problems confronting the international community. The estimated 
number of refugees in the world today varies significantly depending, 
among other things, on how one defines a refugee and the exact date of 
the count. All agree, however, that refugees number in the millions and 
most estimates range between ten and fifteen million. I 
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International legal protection for refugees is primarily codified 
in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees2 and the 1967 
Protocol on the Status of Refugees. 3 To engage the protection of the 
international community today requires a potential refugee to fit within 
the definition found in Article l(A)(2) of the Convention: 
[Someone who,] ... owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country ofhis 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it.4 
This definition has attracted widespread municipal support5 and many 
countries have incorporated this definition directly into local statutory 
regimes dealing with refugees. 6 A significant problem with this 
definition, however, is that more than one-half of the world's de facto 
refugees (those who are, for reasons other than personal convenience, 
outside of their country ofnormal residence) do not fall within its ambit. 7 
In addition, there is no binding obligation on states to grant asylum to 
those who are covered. 
In addition to the definition of a refugee, there is the principle of 
nonrefoulement, codified in Article 33 of the Convention, which reads as 
follows: 
No Contracting state shall expel or return ("refouler") a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of 
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account ofhis race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.8 
This applies only to those who are already within a contracting state and 
not to those seeking refuge from abroad. 
In the first part of this study I review the history of the 
Convention and the Protocol as it is relevant to the shortcomings of these 
two documents. I then discuss more fully the problems, summarized 
above, associated with the Convention definition of refugee. Finally, I 
will canvass some possible practical solutions to the international 
refugee situation. 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The international community's concern with refugees, as we use 
that term today, began after the First World War. In 1921, the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Refugees, the first institution to deal with 
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refugees, was created by the League ofN ations. 9 This was conceived of 
as a temporary office to deal with the exodus ofRussians from the Soviet 
Union. In 1928 a similar arrangement was concluded to cover Assyrian 
and Turkish nationals fleeing their respective states.10 This was 
followed by a series of agreements providing protection for a host of other 
specific groups of refugees.11 
The League of Nations did not attempt to define a refugee in 
general terms but chose to deal with each crisis as it came along. The 
refugees covered by these agreements had the following general charac-
teristics: 
( 1) they [were] nationals of a particular territory; (2) 
they [had] lost the protection, in law or in fact, of the 
particular government controlling the said territory; 
and (3) [were] stateless or possessed no other 
nationality. 2 
The main focus was not on the racial, ethnic, political or religious 
characteristics of the refugees, but on the loss of protection of a national 
state. For example, the agreement covering the Russian exiles noted 
that they "no longer enjoyed the protection of the Government of the 
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and had not acquired another 
nationality."13 
The first general principle of international law concerning refu-
gees appears in Subarticle 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: 
14(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in 
other countries asylum from persecution.14 
The Second World War generated tremendous refugee problems which 
made it necessary to promulgate a more comprehensive scheme for 
dealing with refugees and to create a regime to administer it. In 1950 the 
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees was passed by a United Nations General Assembly resolution, 
establishing a body to deal with refugees.15 
The Convention defined refugees in two ways:16 it included 
those already considered refugees by the various agreements and con-
ventions dealing with stateless persons, 17 and it added a general 
definition of a refugee.18 The definition, however, was restricted in its 
application to those displaced by events occurring before January 1, 
1951. In addition, exposing the European focus of the Convention, 
Subarticle l(B)(l) allowed states to restrict the ambit of the definition to 
events occurring in Europe.19 The Convention improved on previous 
instruments by applying generally, to all nationalities, and by substitut-
ing persecution for lack of national protection as the main criterion for 
granting refugee status. It retained, however, the temporal and geo-
graphical limitations of the previous agreements. 
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By 1967 it was clear that events occurring outside of Europe or 
since 1951 continued to generate refugees who were in need of protection 
but who were not covered by the Convention. It was equally clear that 
these refugees had as much right to asylum as those already covered by 
the Convention. Accordingly, a Protocol was passed by the United 
Nations General Assembly. Article I, Sections 1 and 2, remove the 
temporal and geographical limitations, in the Convention definition of a 
refugee. Article I, Section 3, however, preserves the declarations of 
limitation made under Subarticle l(B)(l)(a) of the Convention.20 As 
Fragomen points out, any state which acceded to the Convention before 
the Protocol could elect to restrict the application ofboth the Convention 
and the Protocol to events in Europe, thereby the main 
purpose of the Protocol while reaping the political benefits. 1 
PROBLEMS WITH THE DEFINITION OF A REFUGEE 
The definition of a refugee found in the Convention is problem-
atic mainly because it excludes a large number of de facto refugees.22 
The tension between the moral imperative to help those who are no 
longer being adequately looked after by their state of normal residence 
and the demands of state sovereignty has affected both the formulation 
and the application of the definition.23 It would appear, however, that 
moral imperatives have had less influence. Hathaway argues that 
neither humanitarian nor human rights principles were important in 
formulating the Convention definition of a refugee .. 24 On the other hand, 
several factors have contributed to the disproportionate influence of 
state sovereignty on the development of the definition. For example, a 
mass influx of refugees into a country compromises the independence of 
that country and in some cases subverts national goals.25 Due to the 
United Nations General Assembly's recognition of the high status of 
state sovereignty, the drafters were well aware that if they worded the 
definition too strongly it would fail to attract sufficient support from the 
international community. Lack of good faith on the part of states jealous 
to safeguard their sovereignty compounds the problems inherent in a 
weak definition. 
Unlike the earlier attempts to deal with refugee crises which 
were concentrated in Europe, modern refugee problems often involve 
people from diverse cultural backgrounds. The prospective receiving 
state feels little affinity to these people and, hence, its commitment to 
helping them is weak.26 The perception that some states manipulate 
mass exoduses to achieve political ends in an international ideological 
battle, further erodes support for effective refugee relief.27 
Other problems flow from the fact that the definition was 
essentially designed to deal with the situation in Europe after World 
War II. The circumstances generating refugees today are profoundly 
different. The persecutors of today are not conquered submissive 
governments but independent sovereign nations. 28 Motivations for both 
persecution and fleeing have changed29 and technological changes have 
also had their impact on the global refugee crisis. Technological 
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contributions include the enhanced capability of states to persecute, the 
proliferation of air travel allowing people to move rapidly and safely 
around the globe, and the massive increase in the flow of information 
generating a greater impetus to leave. 
The Definition of a "Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted" 
Problems associated with the definition of a well-founded fear of 
persecution fall into two categories: those relating to the standard of 
proofrequired and those relating to the definition of'persecution'. Most 
countries accept that proof of a well-founded fear of persecution involves 
both an objective and a subjective component. There is, however, 
considerable disagreement over what the standard of proof should be, 
who should bear the onus of proof, and what evidential strictures should 
be applied. It is crucial to those seeking asylum to know the answers to 
these questions in advance. For the definition to be effective internation-
ally it is imperative that the standard of proof be uniform among 
receiving states. 
The requisite standard ofproofhas attracted considerable atten-
tion in the United States. The United States Supreme Court decided 
that different standards should apply to granting asylum and withhold-
ing deportation. 30 The court held that withholding of deportation, 
which gives rise to an absolute right not to be deported, requires proof on 
the balance of probabilities, while eligibility for asylum, which only 
grants discretionary admittance, requires something less. The United 
States is alone among the Western countries31 in that it has created 
different standards of proof for nonrefoulement and asylum. 
The requirement adopted by most Western countries that both 
objective and subjective components must be proved in order to establish 
a well-founded fear of persecution works injustice on those who have, in 
the heat of the moment, overreacted to what they perceive as persecu-
tion. 32 It is unreasonable to expect those who fear for their physical 
integrity to weigh with nicety the probability of danger. In addition, 
prospective refugees often have limited information and insufficient 
time to come to a reasoned decision on their chances of being abused. 
It is widely recognized that the lack of a definition of persecution 
in the Convention definition of a refugee causes serious problems. 33 At 
the moment, there are great discrepancies between the definitions 
applied in different countries;34 definitions range from very liberal to 
fairly restrictive. The liberal view encompasses several viewpoints: 
those who argue that an affront to human dignity constitutes persecu-
tion,35 those who view violations of human rights as a useful criterion 
for defining persecution, 36 and those who think that deprivation oflife 
or liberty for more than a n1ligible period of time would best demarcate 
the limits of persecution. 3 The restrictive view equates persecution 
with loss oflife or serious deprivation of physical freedom. 38 Hathaway 
criticizes the definition for being flexible enough to allow states to 
manipulate it to accord with their national interests, thereby depriving 
the Convention definition of a refugee of much ofits effect. 39 A definition 
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intended to be used for legal purposes requires clarity and the Conven-
tion definition fails to satisfy this basic requirement. 
V. P. Nanda suggests that, in practice, the definition of persecu-
tion generally adopted is restrictive and applies only to individuals who 
"face discrimination or maltreatment ... of a very serious kind."40 This 
suggestion is supported by case law from various countries. Indeed, even 
in Canada, a country traditionally regarded as liberal in formulating 
refugee policy,41 the interpretation of the definition seems to result in 
the exclusion of many de facto refugees. In Re lyar42 the applicant was 
an Indian living in South Africa. Although she was segregated and not 
allowed to vote, the Immigration Appeal Board held that since she failed 
to identify any incident in which she had been physically persecuted, she 
was the subject of discrimination and not persecution. R. Plender 
identifies a British case where the Immigration Appeals Tribunal held 
that prosecution for breach of a country's laws could not amount to 
persecution.43 If this is correct, then millions of Jews deprived of their 
property and put into camps in Nazi Germany, under the laws of that 
country, would have been ineligible for relief. 
Cognizable Grounds of Persecution 
To qualify as a refugee under the Convention definition, estab-
lishing persecution is not sufficient. The persecution must also be based 
on one of the enumerated grounds: race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group or political opinion. This is an illogical 
additional burden for someone who has been persecuted. If the essence 
ofrefugee status lies in the loss of protection of the state ofresidence due 
to persecution, the basis of that persecution should be irrelevant. D. P. 
Gagliardi argues convincingly that the grounds of persecution should 
not be confused with the fact of persecution itselfand, therefore, should 
not be incorporated into the definition of persecution: 
The cognizable grounds simply describe the tormentor's 
motive; but it is the intent to do harm, not the motive, 
that defines persecution. In short, the cognizable grounds 
focus attention on the wrong question ... Their inclusion 
invites inquiry into factors that are tangential to the 
notion of persecution itself and to the humanitarian 
purpose of providing relief to victims of persecution. 44 
In addition, the definition does not make it clear whether persecution 
based on the fact of membership in one of the cognizable grounds is 
enough or whether persecution for acts taken pursuant to membership 
is required.45 
There are two main ways in which people who are persecuted can 
fail to fit within the cognizable grounds: first, the categories simply do 
not cover all the grounds upon which people are commonly persecuted, 
and second, since a substantial amount of persecution does not have a 
clear motivation but relates to general conditions of violence and repres-
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sion, activity which amounts to persecution may nevertheless fall 
outside the definition. 
Race, religion, and nationality, while subject to different inter-
pretations, are reasonably well defined terms. The political opinion 
category, however, is subject to widely varying interpretation, largely 
based on one's ideological perspective. The United States, for example, 
regularly defined those who had fled from communist countries for 
political reasons as refugees, while declining to do so for those who had 
fled from countries friendly to the United States.46 Political exiles, an 
important group ofrefugees, are often at the mercy of the international 
political scene and factors irrelevant to their persecution may determine 
their international status. 
Hyndman points out that it may be difficult to establish a link 
between a political opinion and the repressive measures taken by the 
state, thus precluding protection despite clearly established persecu-
tion. 47 Western countries have generally accepted that the test as to 
whether something qualifies as political activity should be based on the 
classification of that activity by the ruling government of the country 
from which the refugee fled.48 This is often problematic, however, since 
states generally do not link sanctions explicitly to the political activity 
that inspired them. In some countries the repressive organs that carry 
out persecution have developed sophisticated techniques to mask their 
motivation, particularly when the object is political repression. 
Membership in the 'particular social group' category is also 
subject to varying interpretation, often based on ideology, international 
relations or fear of a massive influx ofrefugees. In a case from the United 
States, Acosta,49 the applicant belonged to a taxi co-operative in El 
Salvador which refused to join in a work stoppage at the request of the 
anti-government guerillas. Subsequently, several of the members were 
killed and Acosta himself received death threats. Although the Immi-
gration Appeal Board accepted Acosta's testimony and held there was a 
well-founded fear of persecution, it denied him relief, holding that the 
taxi co-operative did not qualify as a social group. In a Canadian case, 
Severe, 50 the applicant was a member of a socialist theatrical group in 
Haiti which was critical of the government and whose leaders had been 
harassed constantly by the Tonton Macoute Militiamen. The Board 
classified the group as analogous to a 'literary circle', not a 'social group', 
and rejected the claim.51 In another Canadian case, Belfond,52 the 
Board further limited the term 'social group': 
Either the group must be political and proclaim and 
exhibit dissidence with the regime or be a religious sect 
which has been persecuted by the civil authorities be-
cause of its religious beliefs. In a multinational state, a 
racial minority might constitute such a group. 53 
Such a restrictive interpretation of 'social group' essentially voids the 
category of meaning. 
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Often, a government under attack from guerillas, in what 
amounts to a civil war, will either randomly persecute in areas where it 
suspects the populace generally of supporting the guerillas, or retaliate 
in an over-inclusive way because of inability to effectively identify 
destabilizing elements.54 Many of those affected may be apolitical or 
even supportive of the government; in such a cases the persecution 
cannot properly be said to be based on political opinion. The real cause 
is the government's paranoia or the techniques they have adopted to deal 
with insurgency. The definition is simply not designed to cover such 
situations. In Coriolan v. I.N.S. 55 the court quoted from an Amnesty 
International report on conditions in Haiti under the Duvalier regime: 
There may have been no political activity whatsoever, as 
a large number are imprisoned indiscriminately ... We 
cannot believe, however, that Congress would have 
refused sanctuary to people whose misfortune it was to 
be the victims of a government which did not require 
political activity or opinion to trigger its oppression. 56 
The need for the international community to provide protection from 
random government persecution is as acute as it is when the persecution 
is based on one of the cognizable grounds. 
As Gagliardi points out, random or over-inclusive persecution is 
to be distinguished from destabilization directly associated with civil 
war or invasion by foreign forces.57 In a civil war or during a foreign 
invasion certain measures, such as curfews, military censorship and 
restrained searches, may be enforced as part of a military response. 
Measures not related to military objectives but designed primarily to 
terrorize the population should be classified as persecution. In any 
particular situation it may be difficult to draw a clear line between 
actions with a valid military objective and those essentially designed to 
persecute. 
The Requirement to be Outside Your Country of Nationality 
Another requirement of the Convention definition is that a 
refugee claimant be outside his or her country of nationality. This is a 
requirement that those being persecuted must satisfy to gain the 
protection of the international community, but which is essentially 
unrelated to their need for protection.58 The problem is not insignifi-
cant, as Fragomen points out; such people may constitute a majority of 
those refugees excluded by the Convention definition of a refugee. 59 The 
High Commissioner for Refugees has also complained of this problem: 
[I]t is felt by some that persons who do not cross an 
internationally recognized border should be treated as 




It is clearly inconsistent with the aim ofrefugee law to exclude potential 
refugees merely because they have failed to leave their country of 
residence. Often failure to leave is a direct result of the persecution they 
are suffering from in the first place. 
This requirement also raises questions about the underlying 
premise of modern refugee assistance. Many of those applying for 
refugee status do so because they are involved with secessionist move-
ments contesting the borders of their countries. This is especially true 
in post-colonial countries where the borders rarely conform to ethnic 
divisions. To deny refugee status merely because the claimant is unable 
to escape the contested borders is to deny responsibility for a problem 
often created by Western colonial powers in the first place. Groups 
fighting for independence should represent the quintessential aim of 
modern refugee law; providing an escape for political activists is an 
indirect way of supporting such movements. To require those involved 
in secessionist movements to leave undermines this support both by 
reinforcing, at an international level, the validity of the contested state 
borders and by posing additional obstacles in the way ofrefugee protec-
tion. 
Exclusions 
Article 1, Sections C to F, of the Convention contain a number of 
exceptions to the granting ofrefugee status under the Section A defini-
tion. Sections C and E refer to people who, for one reason or another, 
come within the protection of an acceptable state. Section D disqualifies 
those receiving aid from organs or agencies of the United Nations other 
than the UNHCR. This considerably lessens the scope of the defini-
tion. 61 Subsection F(b) excludes those who have committed serious non-
political crimes. In these cases, the underlying rationale for refugee 
protection is ignored. 'Criminals' may not be highly desirable as new 
citizens but they are surely no less deserving of protection from an 
oppressive state than anyone else. Finally, Subsection F(c) excludes 
those who have "been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the United Nations."62 The scope of the "purposes and 
principles" of the United Nations is undefined. Even ifit were restricted 
to the principles outlined in the United Nations Charter (the most 
restrictive practical interpretation possible), the ambit of this phrase is 
very wide and could easily be abused. These exclusions derogate from 
the principle behind providing refugee protection and should be cur-
tailed accordingly. 
The Discretionary Nature of Granting Asylum 
Neither the Convention nor the Protocol place any obligation on 
signatories to grant asylum to those coming within the definition of a 
refugee; individual states retain absolute discretion to admit or reject 
refugees. 63 Subarticle 33( 1) of the Convention prohibits expulsion of 
refugees to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened 
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but this only applies to persons already within the Contracting State's 
borders. The discretionary nature of the grant of asylum is a fundamen-
tal weakness in the scheme of protection afforded refugees. 64 During 
the Cold War, the West made use of refugees as a propaganda weapon 
in its international ideological battles. As a result, accepting refugees 
has come to be seen as a negative comment upon the internal affairs of 
the state of origin. Many states are thus reluctant to grant refugee status 
to those fleeing friendly regimes and use their discretion to avoid 
political embarrassment at the expense of the claimants.65 Even more 
alarming is the possibility that governments will use their discretion to 
warp the aim of refugee law not only to avoid offending friendly states 
but also to enhance their municipal standing. The effects of this may 
range from only 'importing' educated refugees to introducing a colour 
bias when accepting refugees because of domestic racism.66 
No procedure for determining or admitting refugees is pre-
scribed by the Convention. Thus, states often design their procedures in 
a way that allows them to adapt international obligations to their own 
needs. 67 Such procedures often vary widely. 68 Many countries have 
simply elected not to set up any procedures at all. 69 This glaring lacunae 
in the Convention enables Contracting States to exclude any unwanted 
refugees without acknowledging the real reasons for doing so; thereby 
avoiding international scrutiny. 
The Need For Individual Assessment 
The Convention requires an individual determination ofrefugee 
status. Mass exoduses of people from a state now generate a large 
proportion of all refugees and these pose the greatest chal-
lenges to international refugee law. 7 The assessment procedure 
required to determine refugees under the Convention presents a major 
barrier to efficient processing in the case of a mass migration.71 The 
Convention and Protocol, designed to deal with manageable numbers of 
refugees, are difficult to comply with when huge numbers are involved. 
States initially receiving large refugee flows, generally less 
developed countries with few resources, are often completely unable to 
deal with entrants on an individual basis. Even in states of final refuge, 
despite their generally superior resources, there is a tendency for 
determination systems to generate backlogs. 72 The Convention defini-
tion places the additional burden of individual determination on states 
already reluctant to admit large numbers of refugees. Difficulties in 
applying the Convention definition tends to dilute its acceptance, sup-
port, and uniform application in the international refugee determina-
tion process. 
Displaced Persons 
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the Convention refugee defini-
tion is that it fails to provide any relief for persons dislocated by war, civil 
strife, natural disasters, or serious economic disruptions. 73 The precise 
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problems of displaced persons, referred to by the UNHCR as de facto 
refugees, may differ from the problems of persons who are actively being 
persecuted by their governments, but their need for assistance, espe-
cially immediate aid, is no less imperative. 7 4 Furthermore, the main 
cause of forced migration is not persecution but a combination of natural 
disaster, war and economic turmoil. 75 It is contrary to the basic notion 
of a refugee, as reflected in common parlance, to exclude those fleeing 
from causes other than persecution from international protection under 
the Convention. 
The history of refugee law, starting with the League of Na-
tions,76 is basically a response to the problem of persons displaced by 
diverse factors including war and civil strife. It is inconsistent with this 
history to limit refugee status to those suffering from persecution. As 
Fragomen points out, the distinction between political and economic 
refugees is frequently artificial. 77 Most political and racial oppression 
is based on a struggle for economic control. To try and divorce politics 
and economics is, at a practical level, verging on the ridiculous. The real 
point, however, is that those deprived of basic human needs require 
international protection whether that deprivation is based on direct 
government oppression or factors tangential to it. To deprive displaced 
persons from relief under international refugee law is both inhumane 
and incompatible with the overall aims ofrefugee law. 
SOLUTIONS 
Having established that there are problems with the interna-
tional definition of a refugee, it is now necessary to propose solutions. 
There are really only three viable alternatives in the treatment of 
refugees: voluntary repatriation; temporary absorption into the country 
of first refuge; or final resettlement in a third country.78 The first 
generally requires a change in the circumstances that brought about 
flight in the first place. Chamberlain suggests that the root causes 
should be studied to improve the international community's response to 
the problem through careful development aid. 79 While this is certainly 
a useful suggestion, development aid is unlikely to remove all sources of 
refugees, especially in the short run. 80 
The second and third possibilities require an expansion of the 
Convention definition of a refugee. J. I. Gunning has suggested that 
resistance to widening the definition is based on two arguments: concern 
about the availability of resources and fear that state sovereignty in the 
area of foreign policy would be compromised. 81 To these considerations 
I would add the desire to deter an influx of culturally, racially and 
politically dissimilar people, both for political reasons and general 
xenophobia. 
Moves Towards Expanding the Definition of a Refugee 
The first efforts to expand the definition of a refugee came, 
predictably, from the UNHCR. By 1957, the General Assembly had 
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authorized the UNHCR to use its 'good offices' to aid refugees who fell 
outside their direct mandate.82 In 1965 the General Assembly elimi-
nated the distinction between Convention and non-Convention refugees 
with respect to the UNHCR seeking intetnational assistance for refu-
gees. 83 Finally, in 1975, the General Assembly authorized the UNHCR 
to act for victims of man-made events who were in a situation 'analogous' 
to that of Convention refugees.84 
In 1969, the Organization of African Unity adopted a convention 
to deal with the problem ofrefugees regionally. In addition to covering 
Convention refugees Article 1, Subsection (2) extends the traditional 
coverage: 
The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, 
owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domi-
nation or events seriously disturbing public order in 
either part or the whole of his country of origin or 
nationality is compelled to leave his place of habitual 
residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside 
his country of origin or nationality. 85 
This coverage is similar in its ambit to the 1975 extension of the powers 
of the UNHCR discussed above. 
In 1984, a colloquium on international protection for refugees in 
Central America, Mexico and Panama was held in the Republic of 
Columbia. The Conclusions and Recommendations (known as the 
"Cartegena Declaration on Refugees") calls for the definition of refugee 
to include: 
[P]ersons who have fled their country because their 
lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by gener-
alized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, 
massive violations of human rights or other circum-
stances which have seriously disturbed public order.86 
This definition extends coverage in approximately the same way as the 
OAU Convention and the 1975 amendment to the UNHCR's powers. 
The Problems of Resources and Foreign Policy 
The fear ofrefugee-receiving countries that resources would be 
strained by an expansion of the definition of a refugee is probably 
unfounded. The UNHCR already provides assistance to de facto refu-
gees, so to that extent, no additional resources would be required. More 
importantly, the decision to leave one's country of origin is determined 
primarily by practical considerations, not those set out in the Convention 
definition of a refugee. Further, factors such as cost and the personal 
destabilization likely to ensue prevent the vast majority of those enter-
taining thoughts of leaving their homelands from translating their 
thoughts into action. In any case, one must balance the moral imperative 
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of aiding those who need international protection with the issue of a lack 
of resources. The massive charitable efforts launched each time a new 
crisis occurs suggest that the means to provide assistance are available. 
Presently, production ofrefugees is often viewed by the interna-
tional community as a negative comment on the internal affairs of the 
state of origin. Governments are concerned that an expansion of the 
definition of a refugee will limit state discretion to control admission and 
inhibit their ability to freely determine foreign policy. A significant 
broadening of the scope of the definition of a refugee, however, would 
tend to reduce the ideological content now attached to refugee accept-
ance. By shifting the focus from persecution ofindividuals, which is seen 
as unacceptable, to inability to protect groups, the determination of a 
refugee would be based on economic, as opposed to moral, considera-
tions. The negative foreign policy implications of accepting refugees 
from friendly states would be largely neutralized by the lessened stigma 
of refugee production. 
The Problem of Displaced Persons 
Many of the defects in the Convention definition, discussed 
above, affect only a small number ofrefugees in particular circumstances 
and could be solved by minor adjustments, without significantly altering 
the scope or the object of the definition. The problem of displaced persons, 
whether uprooted by war, civil unrest, serious economic disruption or 
natural disaster, differs in nature from other weaknesses in the defini-
tion in two main respects: first, displaced persons are suffering from a 
qualitatively different problem than persecuted persons and, second, the 
number of displaced persons is extremely large, hence inclusion in the 
definition would require major changes to the operation of any scheme 
designed to deal with refugees. 
It is widely recognized that displaced persons suffer in a quali-
tatively different way than those who are actively persecuted by their 
governments.87 Perhaps the best way to describe this difference is that 
the former require the assistance of the international community while 
the latter require its protection. I propose that the problem of displaced 
persons be dealt with primarily by granting refuge on a temporary basis 
with a view to voluntary repatriation after the conditions giving rise to 
the need for refuge have dissipated. Temporary refuge should be 
organized on a regional basis. This·organization would accord with 
present realities, be acceptable to the international community at large, 
minimize disruption to the individuals involved, and reduce costs. To 
prevent the burden of granting temporary refuge from falling predomi-
nantly on those states accommodating refugee influxes, those who can 
generally least afford it, the financial obligations incurred should be 
distributed according to ability to pay, primarily among the developed 
nations.88 
The idea of temporary refuge has been gaining support in the 
international community, partly because it is practical.89 The OAU 
Convention only extends asylum rights to Convention refugees while 
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displaced persons merely have the right not to be deported 
(nonrefoulement).90 While the principle ofnonrefoulement in Article 33 
of the Convention only extends to refugees, it represents the only 
obligation incurred by State Parties that is beyond their control. Pre-
sumably, individuals entitled to nonrefoulement, but not granted perma-
nent residence, would obtain temporary refuge. Hyndman suggests that 
temporary refuge accords both with state practice and is found in many 
international instruments.91 Hartman has argued convincingly that 
temporary refuge has become a norm of international customary law, at 
least in relation to civilians fleeing internal armed conflict.92 
An advantage of temporary refuge is that it envisages eventual 
voluntary repatriation of the displaced persons once conditions return to 
normal in the state of origin. There are several advantages to this 
relative to the other durable solutions, permanent asylum or resettle-
ment: the individuals involved are not subjected to cultural and political 
disruptions and other traumas attendant upon relocation in a foreign 
environment, costs are minimized, and foreign policy implications are 
reduced.93 
The key to the success or failure of any system proposed for the 
international arena is its acceptability to the actors involved. 94 The 
system being proposed would impose obligations on two sets of states: 
those providing temporary refuge, and those who are being asked to 
sustain the financial burden. Those providing temporary refuge will be 
amenable to this system in part because they are culturally and ethni-
cally similar to the refugees and have a better understanding of their 
plight. The same forces that gave rise to the initial international refugee 
protection in Europe generate sympathy and tolerance with respect to 
refugees from within relatively homogeneous regions.95 These states 
have great difficulty controlling the flow ofrefugees in any case and tend 
to absorb them under the current system despite the lack of any 
obligation to do so. 96 The main concern of states of first asylum is 
generally the tremendous cost associated with large influxes. 97 
The developed nations would also be willing to participate in 
such a system. They are primarily concerned with preventing a mass 
influx of"foreigners" which is seen as a threat to domestic harmony and 
politically dangerous. 98 These nations would see the obligation to pay 
the costs of maintaining refugees abroad as an acceptable trade-off. In 
addition, developed nations already foot a large part of the bill for looking 
after displaced persons through the UNHCR99: a direct obligation 
would not make a big difference to them. Finally, the humanitarian and 
human rights pressures that exist within developed states would exert 
a certain amount of political pressure in favour of such a scheme. 
Temporary dislocation, with a view to eventual repatriation, 
would reduce the disruption in the lives of the refugees, themselves. 
Instead of being transferred into a totally different environment, they 
would remain in the same part of the world and expect to return to their 
homes at some point. This factor would weaken as the length of the 
refugee period increases but the sad fact is that many displaced persons 
spend years in refugee camps as it is.100 Another destabilizing element 
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for displaced persons is their precarious status in the state of first refuge. 
Presumably, once international obligations were entered into, and 
funding put into place, the level of security afforded would increase. 
Instead of being dependent on the whims of a single, host state and the 
'good offices' of the UNHCR, they would be protected by an international 
agreement, possibly under a separate governing agency. 
Finally, the cost of maintaining displaced persons in the state of 
first refuge would be much less than that associated with permanent 
relocation. Various plans for reducing costs, discussed above,101 could 
be implemented. A uniform system for dealing with such people would 
be administratively much more efficient and thereby cut costs. Most 
importantly, the cost of maintenance in states of first refuge would tend 
to be much less than in receiving states due to the nature of their 
economies. 
CONCLUSION 
The Convention definition of a refugee is no longer viable. It was 
originally designed to deal with the limited refugee situation that 
existed forty years ago. Both the passage of time and the internationali-
zation of refugee problems have weakened the effect of the definition to 
the point where a majority of de facto refugees do not even come within 
its ambit. Many of those who should be covered by the definition are not 
afforded protection under the national schemes designed in accordance 
with the Convention's provisions. The UNHCR tries to deal with refugee 
situations as they arise but without guaranteed, long-term funding, the 
response is woefully inadequate. It is clear that a new regime governing 
refugees needs to be promulgated. 
An international proposal for dealing with refugees must be 
acceptable to state governments to gain acceptance. It should also take 
into account current practices with regard to refugees. I suggest that a 
proposal based on the idea of temporary refuge and envisaging eventual 
voluntary repatriation would be most acceptable to all involved. In 
practice, most refugees already remain in the country of first refuge. 
Western states, through the UNHCR, already foot a large part of the bill 
for these refugees and would be amenable to increased funding if they 
could also renounce the obligation to accept large numbers ofrefugees as 
citizens. A treaty, codifying a scheme along these lines, would regularize 
current practices and provide enhanced protection for refugees. 
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